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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether a second search warrant was required to 
enable the officer's to open a locked box discovered during the 
search under the first warrant. 
2. Whether the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant which was issued and executed in this case sufficiently 
established probable cause for the search warrant. 
a. Whether the information in the affidavit was 
so stale as to negate probable cause. 
b. Whether the affidavit sufficiently established 
the reliability of the confidential informant who provided the 
information in the affidavit. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
defendant's conviction. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE HUNDLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860136 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dale Hundley, was charged with possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a 
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (1958) as amended. 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute for value as charged in a 
bench trial held December 9, 1985 in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, presiding. The court sentenced defendant for a 
term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
him $500.00. However, execution on the prison sentence was 
suspended and defendant was placed on probation for a period of 
12 months under specified conditions (R. 69-70). 
This appeal is a companion case to State of Utah v. 
Kelly Hansen, case no. 21016, also pending on appeal. The issues 
raised in both appeals relating to the search of defendants1 
residences are virtually identical. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 16 , 1985, a search warrant was issued to 
o f f i c e r s to search an apartment located at 1097 North 150 West, 
Orem, Utah. The warrant was based upon an a f f i d a v i t presented to 
a magistrate that morning (R. 28, 101) which s ta ted that a 
r e l i a b l e informant, who had provided information in the past 
re su l t ing in several arres t s and conv ic t ions , had been in the 
apartment at the above address on August 11th and saw a large 
amount of marijuana being sold in smaller q u a n t i t i e s (R. 26) . 
(See Addendum A. ) 
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 16 , 1985, four 
o f f i c e r s from Orem City entered an apartment building located at 
1097 North 150 West, Orem, Utah, pursuant to the search warrant 
i ssued that morning (R. 28, 101) . At the time of the search, 
defendant, Dale Hundley and Kelly Hansen resided at that l o c a t i o n 
(R. 101-103) . During the search of defendant's room, o f f i c e r s 
found a green metal box secured by a padlock (R. 109-111) . 
Defendant denied knowing the whereabouts of a key that would 
unlock the box (R. I l l ) ; however, o f f i c e r s found a key that f i t 
the lock connected to defendant's be l t (R. 111-112) . Off icers 
a l so found a matching key in the possess ion of Kelly Hansen (R. 
115) . Prior to opening the box, Officer Edwards smelled the box 
and detected an odor of marijuana (R. 111) . Upon opening the 
metal box, o f f i c e r s discovered a small measuring s c a l e and a 
p l a s t i c bag f i l l e d with approximately one-quarter pound of 
marijuana (R. 113-114) . Large s c a l e s were a l so found in 
defendant's room (R. 108) . Off icers a l s o found a small bag of 
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marijuana in Mr. Hansen's room (R. 134, 140). After Officer 
Edwards read Mr. Hansen his Miranda rights, he confessed that the 
marijuana belonged solely to him and that he had been selling 
smaller quantities of the drug for spending money (R. 117-119). 
The court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from the search (R. 39) and subsequently found defendant guilty 
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value (R. 61-66). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Police officers were justified in opening a locked 
metal box, since it was found within the residence named in the 
warrant, and it was a likely place to hide marijuana. 
The affidavit provided to the magistrate on August 16, 
1985 stating that a confidential informant observed illegal 
activity on August 11, 1985, did not set forth stale information 
of criminal activity. 
Further, the affidavit contained sufficient facts of 
the reliability of the confidential informant. The informant 
personally observed the marijuana being sold at defendant's 
apartment, and had assisted police officers in the past by 
providing information resulting in several arrests and 
convictions. 
Finally, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to 
support defendant's conviction since the marijuana was found in a 
locked container over which defendant exercised control. 
-3-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH OF THE LOCKED METAL BOX WAS WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant contends that any search of the locked metal 
box would require a separate showing of probable cause and a 
separate search warrant notwithstanding the original search 
warrant. This Court has stated that: 
legal searches must not be vulnerable to 
being thwarted simply by the expedient of 
concealment in unusual locations. Rather, 
the limitation on the scope of a search 
pursuant to a warrant is drawn in terms 
of those areas where it is reasonable to 
believe that the listed evidence could be 
located. 
State v. Romero, 660 P. 2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983) citing United 
States v. Chadwell, 427 F.Supp. 692, 696 (B. Del. 1977). In 
Romero, the defendant argued the search was unreasonable because 
the police searched the bedroom, garage, vehicles, and grounds; 
places where the defendant claims business papers listed in the 
warrant were unlikely to be found. 
This case is similar to United States v. Gomez-Soto, 
723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984) cert, denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984), 
which involved the search of a locked briefcase found in 
defendant's home. There, the court found that: 
[t]he briefcase would be a logical container 
for any of the many things specifically 
described in the warrant . . . . The failure 
of the warrant to anticipate the precise con-
tainer in which the material sought might be 
found is not fatal. 
Id. at 655. The court further stated: 
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l i l t i s axiomatic tha t if a warrant suf f i -
c ient ly describes the premises to be 
searched, t h i s wi l l jus t i fy a search of the 
personal effects therein belonging to the 
person occupying the premises if those ef-
fec ts might contain the items described in 
the warrant. 
i d . at 654, c i t ing United S ta tes v. Rossy 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 
(1982). 
In United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 
1981), defendant urged the court to suppress money, introduced 
into evidence, which was taken from a jewelry box. Defendant 
claimed that his expectation of privacy in the jewelry box was 
independent of his expectation of privacy in his home. The court 
stated: 
"To follow appe l l an t ' s log ic would require 
ei ther that an addi t ional search warrant 
be obtained for each container within a 
larger container . . . or that the agent 
seeking the warrant possess extrasensory 
perception so that he could describe, 
prior to entering the house, the speci f ic 
boxes, su i t ca ses , sofas, c lo se t s , e t c . , 
tha t he ant ic ipated searching. Obviously 
neither a l t e rna t ive i s reasonable or r e -
quired. " 
i d . a t 573. 
In the case a t bar, a locked box would be a l i ke ly 
place to hide contraband. Furthermore, at trial, Officer 
Edwards, who has been involved in previous cases dealing with 
marijuana, picked up the metal box, smelled it, and testified 
that he thought he detected the odor of marijuana (R. 111). The 
officer then asked defendant for a key to open the box and 
defendant claimed that he did not have one (R. Ill) Officer 
Edwards then found a key connected to defendant's belt, which the 
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officer used to open the lock on the box (R. 111-112). 
Immediately thereafter the officer observed and seized the 
incriminating evidence (R. 113-114). Based upon these 
uncontroverted facts, Officer Edwards clearly had reason to 
believe that the listed evidence could be located in the locked 
metal box. 
Defendan t ' s r e l i a n c e on United S t a t e s v . Chadwickf 433 
U.S. 1 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sande r s , 442 U.S. 753 (1979), i s 
misplaced. Both cases involved w a r r a n t l e s s s ea rches of motor 
v e h i c l e s and locked c o n t a i n e r s found w i t h i n the v e h i c l e s . 
Several c o u r t s have d i s t i n g u i s h e d Chadwick and Sanders from cases 
invo lv ing search w a r r a n t s . In Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654, the 
cour t no ted : 
The cases involving locked luggage in auto-
mobiles are not in point, for those all deal 
with unwarranted searches of automobiles 
which have been allowed under exceptional 
circumstances. 
Id. at 654. Similarly, in Ross, 456 U.S. at 798, the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
A lawful search of fixed premises generally 
extends to the entire area in which the ob-
ject of the search may be found and is not 
limited by the possibility that separate 
acts of entry or opening may be required to 
complete the search. Thus, a warrant that 
authorizes an officer to search a home for 
illegal weapons also provides authority to 
open closets, chests, drawers, and containers 
in which the weapon might be found. 
-6-
Id. at 820-21.! 
An officer should not be required to foresee and 
sufficiently describe in a search warrant every potential 
container where evidence might be found in a residence, nor 
should the officer be required to obtain additional search 
warrants to search those areas as long as the containers could 
reasonably contain the items searched for and the containers are 
found within the area described in the search warrant. Since the 
metal container in the case at bar was found on the premises 
identified in the search warrant, and since the container was a 
likely place to store marijuana, the ruling of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT 
Defendant alleges the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant is defective due to: (1) the lapse of time between the 
observation of the informant and the signing of the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant; and (2) insufficient information 
for the magistrate to determine that probable cause existed. 
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The State is aware that this Court has recently suggested that 
* Chadwick and Sanders are thoroughly reviewed in Ross which held 
that if probable cause e x i s t e d to search a v e h i c l e , the po l i ce 
could, without a warrant, search the en t i re v e h i c l e , including 
c losed containers . Sanders was thus p a r t i a l l y overruled. 
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the S ta te cons t i tu t iona l standard could be construed to expand 
cons t i tu t iona l protect ion beyond tha t mandated by the United 
S ta tes Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ear l , 
716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); S ta te v. Hvgh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 
(Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring); however, t h i s Court has 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y construed Ar t ic le I , § 14 and the Fourth Amendment, 
which t ex tua l ly are nearly i den t i c a l , as providing the same scope 
of pro tec t ion . See e. g. , S ta te v. Cr iscola , 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 
P.2d 517 (1968); S ta te v. Lopes, 552 P. 2d 120 (Utah 1976). There 
i s no good reason here to construe Ar t ic le I , § 14 more narrowly 
than the Fourth Amendment has been in te rp re ted , since the case a t 
bar involves a search and seizure of evidence pursuant to a 
search warrant, which area of law has been c lear ly se t forth and 
well defined. See also S ta te v. Babbell, no. 21033, Respondent's 
Brief Point I for a complete discussion of t h i s i s sue . Point I 
of Respondent's Babbell brief addressing t h i s issue i s at tached 
as Addendum C of t h i s br ief . 
In reviewing the v a l i d i t y of a search warrant, t h i s 
Court has shown great deference to a mag i s t r a t e ' s determination 
of probable cause. State v. Jordan, 665 P. 2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 
1983); S ta te v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983). The 
standard of probable cause r e l i ed upon by magis t ra tes in issuing 
search warrants i s p robabi l i ty , not a prima facie showing, of 
criminal a c t i v i t y . State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 
1983); S ta te v. For t , 572 P.2d 1387, 1399 (Utah 1977). In the 
case a t bar the a f f idav i t provided to the magis t ra te se t forth 
suf f ic ien t probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search 
warrant. 
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A. THE INFORMATION THE MAGISTRATE RELIED 
UPON IN ISSUING THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
NOT STALE. 
Defendant claims that because the informant observed 
marijuana being sold on August 11, 1985, but did not sign the 
affidavit until August 16, 1985, the information was stale and 
thus, probable cause to issue the search warrant did not exist. 
As an initial matter, defendant has failed to support 
this claim with any legal analysis or reference to legal 
authority. Accordingly, the claim should be summarily dismissed. 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1985). 
Should this Court decide to reach this issue, the 
information in the affidavit was not stale so as to invalidate a 
finding of probable cause. 
Affidavits for search warrants must be tested by 
magistrates and courts in a common-sense fashion. State v. 
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1983), citing United States 
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). The resolution of 
marginal cases should largely be determined by the preference to 
be accorded warrants. Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1261, citing Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1959). As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983): 
[W]e have repeatedly said tha t a f t e r - the - f ac t 
scrut iny by courts of the sufficiency of an 
a f f idav i t should not take the form of de novo 
review. A magis t ra te 1 s "determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference 
by reviewing cour t s . " S p i n e l l i , supra, a t 
419. "A grudging or negative a t t i t u d e by re -
viewing courts toward warrants ," Ventresca, 
380 U.S. , at 108, i s inconsis tent with the 
Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
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searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 
"courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by 
interpreting affidavit Is] in a hypertechnical, 
rather than a commonsense, manner." Id., at 
109. 
462 U.S. at 236. 
Proof of facts supporting probable cause must be 
closely related to the issuance of a search warrant to justify a 
finding of probable cause at the time the warrant is issued. 
Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). A search 
warrant is said to b$ stale when the date the incriminating 
evidence is observed is so remote in time from the date of 
application for the warrant as to render it improbable that the 
evidence still exists at the stated location. Garza v. State, 
120 Tex. Crim. 147, 149, 48 S.W.2d 625 (1932); Davidson v. State, 
458 A. 2d 875, 880 (Md. App. 1983). Whether the information is 
stale must be determined by the circumstances of each case. 
Sgro, 287 U.S. at 210-11 (1932). 
The passage of time, alone, is not the sole factor to 
consider, Davidson, 458 A.2d at 880, and staleness questions can 
not be resolved by the mere counting of days between an event and 
the subsequent issuance of a warrant. 
Common sense demands that the Court also 
consider such factors as the nature of 
the crime under investigation, the dura-
tion of ths investigation, the type of 
evidence which is sought and the location 
of the search in determining whether 
probable cause has evaporated. 
Davidson v. State, 458 A.2d 875, 880 (Md. App. 1983). See also 
United States v. Fost_er. 711 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The 
passage of time is not necessarily a controlling factor in 
-10-
determining the exis tence of probable cause. The court should 
a l so evaluate the nature of the criminal a c t i v i t y and the kind of 
property for which authorization to search i s sought"). 
The business of dealing in i l l e g a l drugs i s ordinar i ly 
a regenerating a c t i v i t y carried on over a period of time, 
Davidson, 458 A.2d at 880, and probable cause may continue for 
several weeks, if not months, of the l a s t reported instance of 
suspected a c t i v i t y . United S ta te s v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 
1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) . 
Therefore, a warrant authorizing a search for 
control led substances may be properly issued several days after 
an informant observes the i l l e g a l drugs. United State v. Angulo-
Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) (approximately 24 days); 
Davidson v. S t a t e , 458 A.2d 875 (Md. App. 1983) (19 days); Zaner 
v. S t a t e , 444 So. 2d 508 (Fla. App. 1984) (14 days); Gi les v. 
S t a t e , 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S. E. 2d 154 (1979) (marijuana 
observed within l a s t 5 days); People v. Hal l iday, 73 111. App.3d 
615, 392 N.E.2d 389 (1979) (4 days); State v. Blaurock, 143 N.J. 
Super 476, 363 A.2d 909 (1976) (18 days) . 
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) , t h i s 
Court found that a search warrant for marijuana was not s t a l e , 
although the a f f i d a v i t f a i l e d to s t a t e the date when the 
informant observed contraband at d e f e n d a n t s res idence. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the magistrate had no knowledge of 
how remote the information was, t h i s Court held that "the 
a f f i d a v i t in the instant case , couched as i t i s in present- tense 
language which described on-going criminal a c t i v i t y , c l ear ly 
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r e f u t e s any c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i t was based upon s t a l e i n f o r m a t i o n . " 
Anderton, 668 P.2d a t 1261 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . 
In t h e case a t bar, paragraph (8) of t h e a f f i d a v i t 
s t a t e s the m a t e r i a l s "are be ing h e l d i n v i o l a t i o n . • . " and 
paragraph (6) s t a t e s , "the informant . . . saw . . • [whi l e a t 
d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e ] a l a r g e q u a n t i t y of marijuana which was 
being s o l d i n smal ler q u a n t i t i e s " (Addendum A) . The i n f o r m a t i o n 
i n the a f f i d a v i t t h a t the informant observed a l a r g e q u a n t i t y of 
marijuana being s o l d i n smal l er q u a n t i t i e s , would l e a d a 
m a g i s t r a t e t o conc lude t h a t marijuana would l i k e l y be found a t 
the s t a t e d l o c a t i o n f i v e days a f t e r the i n f o r m a n t ' s o b s e r v a t i o n . 
Defendant contends t h a t the m a g i s t r a t e l a c k e d a 
r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s t o b e l i e v e marijuana would be found i n 
d e f e n d a n t ' s apartment f i v e days a f t e r the i n f o r m a n t ' s 
o b s e r v a t i o n . However, s i n c e the a f f i d a v i t i n t h e case a t bar 
c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t the informant had provided r e l i a b l e 
i n f o r m a t i o n in t h e p a s t , t h e informant observed a l a r g e q u a n t i t y 
of marijuana be ing s o l d i n small p o r t i o n s , and defendant had a 
pr ior a r r e s t record for c o n t r o l l e d subs tance v i o l a t i o n s , t h e 
m a g i s t r a t e had probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h a t marijuana would be 
found a t t h e apartment f i v e days a f t e r the i n f o r m a n t ' s 
o b s e r v a t i o n . 
B. THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED SUFFICIENT INDICIA 
OF RELIABILITY FOR THE MAGISTRATE TO FIND 
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED. 
Defendant contends the a f f i d a v i t i n the i n s t a n t c a s e i s 
i n s u f f i c i e n t b e c a u s e : (1) t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d by the 
informant i s vague and (2) no f a c t s e x i s t t o e s t a b l i s h the 
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informant's r e l i a b i l i t y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , defendant argues the 
a f f i d a v i t should have s tated the approximate amount of marijuana 
observed, and how recently and on how many occasions r e l i a b l e 
information had been provided. 
Again, defendant has f a i l e d to support h i s claims with 
any l ega l ana lys i s or reference to l ega l authori ty . Accordingly, 
t h i s claim should be summarily dismissed. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1985) . 
Should t h i s Court decide to reach the i s s u e , the 
relevant l ega l authority e s t a b l i s h e s that defendant's claims lack 
merit . 
Prior to I l l i n o i s v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) the 
t e s t to determine an informant's r e l i a b i l i t y was e s tab l i shed in 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and S p i n e l l i v. United 
S t a t e s , 393 U.S. 410 (1969) which requires , f i r s t , that the 
informant have some bas is of knowledge for h i s statements; and 
second, that the informant i s credible or the information i s 
r e l i a b l e . The Agui lar -Sp ine l l i t e s t was abandoned by the United 
S ta te s Supreme Court in I l l i n o i s v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 
and Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984) and replaced with 
a " t o t a l i t y of circumstances" standard. This Court a l so adopted 
the standard in Gates and Upton in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099 (Utah 1985) and State v. Ba i l ey , 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984). 
*
n
 Ba i l ey , t h i s Court s tated that even under the Gates t e s t , i t 
might be necessary to comply with the Agui lar—Spine l l i two-
pronged t e s t to e s t a b l i s h the necessary "fair probabi l i ty" that 
the evidence sought could be found at the l oca t ion claimed by the 
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informant. However, "if the circumstances as a whole indica te 
tha t the in fo rman t s report i s t r u t h f u l , " Bailey, 675 P.2d a t 
1205-06, then *a l e s s strong showing of the bas is of af f iant*s 
knowledge, veraci ty and r e l i a b i l i t y may be required ." I d . See 
a l so fitate v, Espinoza,2 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
The task of the issuing magistrate i s simply 
to make a p r a c t i c a l , common-sense decision 
whether, given a l l the circumstances set 
forth in the a f f idav i t before him, including 
the "veraci ty" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
i s a fa i r probabi l i ty that contraband or 
evidence of a crime wil l be found in a 
par t i cu la r place. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d a t 1101, note 8, c i t ing Gates, 462 U.S. at 
238. 
In the case a t bar, the a f f idav i t viewed in i t s 
en t i r e ty and in a common sense fashion set forth su f f i c ien t f ac t s 
to support the c r e d i b i l i t y of the informant and the information 
provided by the informant. 
F i r s t , while v i s i t i n g defendant 's apartment, the 
informant saw a la rge quant i ty of marijuana which was being sold 
in smaller q u a n t i t i e s (1 16 of the a f f i d a v i t ) . Second, the 
informant had supplied information to the a f f ian t in the past 
which had resul ted in several felony a r r e s t s and convictions (1[ 5 
of the a f f i d a v i t ) . F ina l ly , defendant had been previously 
a r res ted for v io la t ions of the Utah Controlled Substance Act (1 7 
of the a f f i d a v i t ) . 
2
 In E^pij}PZJr t h i s court did not c i t e to the s l i g h t modification 
in Bailey, but instead r e l i ed upon the t o t a l i t y of circumstances 
t e s t adopted by t h i s Court in Anderson. 
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Defendant complains tha t the information in the 
af f idavi t i s vague. However, deta i led descr ipt ion of criminal 
a c t i v i t y i s only necessary when the informant 's means of 
knowledge i s not s ta ted . Tomblin v. S t a t e , 128 Ga. App. 823, 
825, 198 S.E. 2d 366, 368 (1973); Sp ine l l i v. United S t a t e s , 393 
U.S. 410, 416 (1969). See also People v. Hall iday, 73 111. App. 
3d 615, 392 N. E. 2d 389 (1979); S ta te v. Weinberg, 364 So. 2d 964 
(La. 1978). Therefore, since the informant in the case at bar 
"v is i ted the residence of Dale Hundley" and personally observed 
"a la rge quanti ty of marijuana which was being sold in small 
q u a n t i t i e s , " the informant 's basis of knowledge was suf f ic ien t ly 
set for th . Moreover, to s t a t e further d e t a i l s in the af f idavi t 
would have risked exposure of the informant 's i den t i t y without a 
measurable increase in relevant information to aid the 
magistrate . Davidson v. S t a t e , 458 A.2d 875, 880 (Md. App. 
1983). 
Defendant contends tha t the a f f idavi t fa i led to 
suf f ic ien t ly describe the informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y . In S ta te v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719, n. 5 (Utah 1983), t h i s Court upheld a 
search warrant even though " I t l he af f idavi t did not expressly 
aver tha t the informant was credible or h is information 
r e l i a b l e ! . ] " Other courts have not required much de ta i l in an 
af f idavi t concerning an informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y . See e.cj. , State 
v. Horwedel, 674 P.2d 623 (Or. App. 1984) ( i t i s not necessary 
that an a f f iant describe the informant 's f ami l i a r i ty with the 
speci f ic drug a t i s s u e ) ; S ta te v. Weinberg, 364 So.2d 964 (La. 
1978) (a confidential informant who had supplied information in 
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the past which led to a r r e s t s supported an informant 's 
r e l i a b i l i t y - ) ; Clyatt v. S t a t e , 126 Ga. App. 779, 192 S.E. 2d 417 
(1972) U t l h e informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y was es tabl ished by the 
a f f i a n t ' s statement that the confidential informant had given him 
rel iable information in the l a s t 90 days); Grant v. S t a t e , 130 
Ga. App. 237, 202 S.E. 2d 675 (1973) C t t l h e his tory of dealing 
with the informant was a suf f ic ient reason to show the l a t t e r ' s 
r e l i a b i l i t y - ) . Thus, the a f f i a n t ' s statement tha t the informant, 
in the pas t , had given information to the af f iant which resul ted 
in several felony a r r e s t s and convictions i s in harmony with the 
standards set forth for determining an informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y 
and verac i ty . 
Defendant also argues t ha t the a f f idav i t fa i led to 
ind ica te whether defendant was present or had any control over 
the mariijuana at the time of the informant 's observat ion.3 
Because defendant f a i l s to give any legal ana lys is or au thor i ty 
to support h i s argument, t h i s Court need not address t h i s i s sue . 
S ta te v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Such information, though, i s not necessary to issue a 
search warrant to search and seize evidence a t a designated 
loca t ion . Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1982) provides : 
A search warrant i s an order issued by a 
magistrate in the name of the s t a t e and 
di rected to a peace of f icer , describing 
with p a r t i c u l a r i t y the thing, place or 
person to be searched and the property 
3 Defendant asserts this argument in Point III of his brief. 
Because this issue pertains to the sufficiency of the affidavit 
supporting the search warrant, the state chooses to address this 
issue at this point of its brief. 
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or evidence to be seized by him and 
brought before the magistrate. 
The affidavit in the instant case was directed to a place, not a 
person, to be searched. As such, the affidavit sufficiently 
described the place to be searched and the evidence to be seized. 
In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) this 
Court stated: 
The fact that defendant Lana Anderton was 
not named in the search warrant is of no 
moment, because the resultant search and 
the stipulation of facts placed her in 
constructive, if not actual, possession of 
a large quantity of contraband which was 
obviously intended for distribution. 
668 P.2d at 1262. See also State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 
(Utah 1985) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3 (1982) which do not 
require that the defendant's name be tied in with the crime. 
In Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1972), 
the appellant contended that the affiaavit failed to state that 
he was in possession of contraband at the premises named in the 
search warrant. The court found that the affidavit was 
sufficient if it described the location (residence) where the 
contraband was observed, i.e., ownership of the contraband was 
not necessary information in finding probable cause. Clearly, 
the fact that a large amount of marijuana was being sold in small 
quantities at 1097 North 15 West in Orem, was sufficient 
information to presume that the marijuana would be located at the 
same premises five days later in lieu of information concerning 
the ownership of the marijuana. 
Finally, defendant argues the affidavit is insufficient 
because it states that defendant has been arrested for other 
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controlled substance violations and defendant claims that his rap 
sheet does not disclose any arrests for controlled substance 
violations. Because defendant fails to include the rap sheet in 
the record, this court should not consider his claim. State v. 
Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984), (Mtjhis Court cannot rule 
on matters outside the record.") 
Assuming the controlled substance arrests did not 
appear on defendant's rap sheet, the search warrant was correctly 
issued since the affidavit still supports a finding of probable 
cause without including the possible misstatement. See State v. 
Nielsen, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Stewart, J. dissenting October 
6, 1986). 
In Nielsen, the affiant intentionally testified falsely 
in the affidavit regarding an informant and also repeated 
perjured testimony at the preliminary hearing. This Court found 
that since the false statements did not materially affect the 
finding of probable cause, the evidence obtained under the 
warrant need not be suppressed. This Court cited Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 in its ruling: 
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to challenge the 
validity of a search warrant if the defen-
dant can establish that (i) an affiant in 
an affidavit supporting a search warrant 
made a false statement intentionally, 
knowingly, or with reckless disregard for 
the truth, and (ii) the affidavit is insuff-
icient to support a finding of probable 
cause after the misstatement is set aside. 
Nielsen, 43 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14-15. 
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In the case at bar the defendant has failed to 
establish that the affiant intentionally misrepresented 
defendant's arrest record assuming the defendant did prove an 
intentional misrepresentation the affidavit is s t i l l sufficient 
to support a finding of probable cause without the information 
regarding defendants arrest record. See supra p. 11
 r 1 4 . 
Furthermore, even i f t h i s Court f i n d s t h e in format ion 
i n the a f f i d a v i t u n r e l i a b l e and the subsequent warrant i n v a l i d , 
the ev idence should not be suppressed a s t h e r e s u l t of an 
unlawful search and s e i z u r e u n l e s s the court f i n d s a s u b s t a n t i a l 
v i o l a t i o n and t h a t the search and s e i z u r e was not committed i n 
good f a i t h . Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 4 See a l s o 
S t a t e v . B a b b e l l , no, 2 1 0 3 3 , Respondent ' s Br ie f Point IB for a 
complete d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s i s s u e . Po in t IB of the Respondent ' s 
Babbel l Brief i s a t t a c h e d a s Addendum C of t h i s b r i e f . 
POINT I I I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFEN-
DANT'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant argues that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to establish his guilt of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute for value. 
4 Section 77-35-12(g)(1) provides: 
In any motion concerning the admissibility 
of evidence or the suppression of evidence 
pursuant to this section or at trial, upon 
grounds of unlawful search and seizure, 
the suppression of evidence shall not be 
granted unless the court finds the viola-
tion upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in 
good faith. The court shall set forth its 
reasons for such finding. 
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The standard of review for insufficiency of evidence 
claim i s as follows: 
This Court ' s standard of review when faced 
with a claim of insufficiency of the evidence 
i s to view the evidence, and the fac ts reason-
ably to be inferred therefrom, in the l i g h t 
most favorable to the determiniation made 
by the t r i e r of fac t . We will only in t e r f e re 
when the evidence i s so lacking and insub-
s t a n t i a l that a reasonable person could not 
possibly have determined gu i l t beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Sta te v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320-321 (Utah 1985) (Hall, C .J . , 
concurring in par t , d issent ing in p a r t ) . See a l s o . S ta te v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). 
In S ta te v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980), the 
Court also s t a t ed : 
I t i s the defendant 's burden to e s t ab l i sh 
tha t the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubs tan t ia l tha t reasonable minds must 
have enter ta ined a reasonable doubt tha t 
the defendant committed the crime charged. 
Id. a t 1168, emphasis adoed. Under these standards of review, 
defendant 's conviction should be affirmed. 
The fac ts of t h i s case support the ve rd ic t . Defendant 
and Kelly Hansen shared the same apartment for f ive to six months 
(R. 64) and had known each other for four to f ive years (R. 128). 
A large quantity of marijuana and other drug-related 
paraphernalia were found ins ide a cash box located in defendant 's 
room and locked with de f endan t s lock (R. 109-110, 113-114). 
After defendant denied having a key to the lock, the off icer 
opened the lock with a key found in defendant 's pant pocket in 
the immediate v i c i n i t y of the cash box (R. 111-112). Large 
scales were also v i s ib ly present in defendant 's room (R. 108). 
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The trial court found that these incriminating 
circumstances clearly created "an inference that defendant 
Hundley not only know of the presence of marijuana in the box, 
but he had immediate access to the contents of the box through 
the use of his key on his lock which secured the box" (R. 63). 
The contents of the cash box (a quarter pound of 
marijuana, additional baggies, and a small hand scale) (R. 113-
114) led the trial court to the conclusion that defendant 
"possesses said substance [marijuana] in a condition conducive to 
sales and in fact intended to participate in the selling of the 
contraband therefound" (R. 64)* 
Defendant states that the case of State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) "enlightens this issue" and is "similar to 
the case at hand." (App. Br. at 10). In Fox, this Court stated 
that a conviction may be based on constructive possession. Fox, 
709 P.2d at 319. 
To find that a defendant had constructive 
possession of a drug or other contraband, 
it is necessary to prove that there was a 
sufficient nexus between the accused and 
the drug to permit an inference that the 
accused had both the power and the intent 
to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug . . . Whether a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug exists 
depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of each case. 
Id. citations omitted. 
The Court listed various "factors which might combine 
to show a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug": 
(1) "incriminating behavior of the accused;" (2) "presence of 
drugs in a specific area over which the accused had control, such 
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as a c loset or drawer containing the accuseds clothing or other 
personal e f f ec t s ; " and (3) "presence of drug paraphernalia among 
the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the 
accused has special con t ro l . " Id. 
This Court found suf f ic ien t evidence to support Gary 
Fox's convict ion: 
Although he may not have had exclusive control 
or possession (in a prac t ica l non-legal sense) 
of the premises, his non-exclusive possession 
and control combined with other incriminating 
evidence to provide an adequate foundation 
for the convict ions. Gary owned the house. 
His occupancy and control by the presence of 
his personal effects in the same room as 
marijuana, drug-related paraphernal ia , and a 
book e n t i t l e d 'Marijuana Growers' Guide. 
Id. at 319-320, c i t a t i o n s omitted. However, t h i s Court found 
that the evidence did not support a conviction for Clive Fox. 
The evidence showed tha t the telephone a t 246 
Harris S t ree t was in C l ive ' s name, tha t he was 
seen there on an undated occasion doing yard 
work, tha t mail addressed to him was found at 
unspecified loca t ions within the house, and 
that h is expired i den t i f i ca t i on card was found 
in the room tha t apparently was h is sleeping 
qua r t e r s , which contained no marijuana or 
re la ted paraphernal ia . On the t o t a l i t y of 
the evidence, a reasonable person could not 
find a reasonable doubt tha t Clive had even 
non-exclusive dominion or control over the 
area where the marijuana was found. There 
was not any evidence a t a l l beyond the poss i -
b i l i t y tha t Clive sometimes occupied the 
premises to l ink Clive Fox to the marijuana. 
In addi t ion , there i s no evidence tha t Clive 
grew the marijuana p lan ts or pa r t i c ipa ted 
in producing or d i s t r i bu t ing the marijuana . 
709 P.2d a t 320. 
In the present case, the fact that defendant was a co-
resident at 1097 North 150 West, Orem, Utah was not sufficient to 
establish constructive possession. Fox 709 P.2d at 319. 
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However, the fol lowing fac tors as l i s t e d in Fox show a s u f f i c i e n t 
nexus between defendant and the drugs: (1) defendant became 
h o s t i l e and ag i ta ted when the marijuana was discovered (R. 112); 
(2) the locked metal box with the marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia was found in defendant's room under h i s c lo thes 
(R. 109-110); and (3) the large s c a l e s , as well as the marijuana 
were found in an area which defendant had spec ia l contro l—his 
room (R. 108) . Therefore, t h i s case c l ear ly s a t i s f i e s the 
factors listed in Fox giving defendant constructive possession of 
the items in question. 
Defendant also relies on State v. Andertonf 668 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1983) as being similar to the instant case. In 
Anderton, this Court affirmed the conviction of Carl Anderton for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute for value, 
however reversed the conviction of Carl's wife, Lana. This Court 
found that Lana Anderton's conviction was based solely on her 
joint ownership of and residence in the home where the drugs were 
found. Anderton at 668 P.2d 1263. This Court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to convict Lana Anderton based upon the 
following facts: 
There is no evidence as to where in the home 
the drugs were found or where the defendant 
Lana Anderton was when the officers entered 
the house. Moreover, there is no evidence 
of any incriminating conduct or statements 
of Lana Anderton. Thus, there is nothing 
which establishes that the drugs were in her 
view, accessible or even close to her, or 
that she was participating in the use of the 
drugs or knew of their presence in the house. 
668 P.2d at 1265. 
This Court further stated that it would require a "leap 
of faith to find that Lana Anderton is guilty solely on the basis 
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of her marital relationship with her husband and their joint 
occupancy of the home." 668 P.2d at 1265. 
The evidence in the case at bar clearly indicates that 
the marijuana, as well as drug paraphernalia, was found in 
defendant's room and defendant clearly had special control over 
the marijuana. See supra p. 22-23. The defendant has failed to 
establish that the evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime charged and thus, the conviction should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the r e a s o n s s t a t e d above , the S t a t e r e s p e c t f u l l y 
submits that d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n be a f f i rmed . 
DATED t h i s /JZ day of November, 1 9 8 6 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY fi. HORNAK 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mai l ed four true and a c c u r a t e 
c o p i e s of the f o r e g o i n g b r i e f t o Gary H. Weight , a t t o r n e y for 
a p p e l l a n t , 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 8 4 6 0 3 , 
p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s /-U_ day of November, 1986 . 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
O l f t C O I T C O D I T , O H M D i r A B T N I l T 
UTA1 COUBTT, STATE OF UTA1 
) FEOIAELE CAUSI AFFIDAVIT 
) IN SUPPORT OF AID HOTIOI 
STATE OF UTAH, ) FOE A SEAECH VAEEAIT 
) 
-VS- ) 
) CBBt No. 
DALE HUNDLEY ) 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
t SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1. J. Peter Hansen, being firat duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and aayai 
2. That I am a police officer for the Orem Department 
of Public Safety, Orem, Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. That Dale J. Hundley lives at the address 1097 
North ISO Vest Orem, Utah County, Utah. 
4. That your affiant d e s c r i b e s the address at 1097 
North 150 Veat aa an east-facing brown brick four-plex vith the 
numbera 1097 on the door of the upper floor north apartment in 
Orem, Utah County, Utah. 
5. That your affiant has had contact vith a confiden-
tial informant who haa aupplied your affiant vith information in 
the p a s t v h i c h haa resulted in several felony arreata and 
convictiona. 
6. That your affiant v n told by thia informant that on 
Auguat 11, 1985 the informant viaited the residence of Dale 
Hundley and while there eav a large quantity of marijuana vhich 
7. That your affiant la raailiar with Dale Hundley aa 
he hat been arrested by officers of the Orea Departaent of Public 
Safety for controlled aubstance violations. 
8. That the •itirlali sought by this application for 
tearch and aeiture warrant are being held in v i o l a t i o n of the 
Itah Controlled Substance Act and of the Utah Code Annotated and 
re evidence of felonious drug criaes. 
J• Peter Hansen 
AFFIANT 
bscribed and sworn to before ae this day of August, 1985, 
hrs. 
CIRCUIT COURT HACISTRATE 
ADDENDUM B 
§W74. Prohibited seta—Ptnaltiaa — (1) Prohibited act* A—Penal-
tits: 
(a) Eicept M authorised by thu set, it ahall be unlawful for any 
peraoD knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) To produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) To dutribute for value or poueu with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or counterfeit aubstance; 
(tit) To poueu a controlled substance enumerated in section 58-
37-4 in the course of his business as a sales representative of a manu-
facturer or distributor of substances enumerated in schedules II through 
V of aection &8 37-4 eicept pursuant to an order or prescntion; 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value or to negotiate to ha\e a controlled sub-
stance distributed or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, or 
negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific controlled substance ao offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated 
ADDENDUM C 
between the promotion of l eg i t imate governmental i n t e r e s t s and 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r e s t in being free from intrus ions on 
fundamental cons t i tu t iona l r igh t s . Gatest 462 U.S. at 239. See 
a l so I l l i n o i s v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983); American 
fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1073-75 (Utah 1985) 
(p lura l i ty opinion)• 
The State i s aware that several of t h i s Court1 s recent 
opinions have suggested that , as has been done in some other 
s t a t e s with the ir cons t i tu t ions 1 search-and-seizure provis ions , 
a r t i c l e I , sec t ion 14 could be construed t o expand cons t i tu t iona l 
protect ion beyond that mandated by the United States Supreme 
Court under the fourth amendment. State v. Earl , 716 P.2d 803, 
805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring separate ly ) . As an i n i t i a l 
matter, there i s nothing in e i ther the text of the s ta te 
provision (which i s nearly iden t i ca l t o the fourth amendment) or 
the h i s tory of i t s adoption^ that suggests that the framers of 
5 The State has been able to find only a brief reference to 
a r t i c l e I , sec t ion 14 at the Const i tut ional Convention of 1985. 
The fol lowing appears to be the ent i re record of any proceedings 
in that regard: 
The Chairman: Gentlemen, we w i l l take up 
sec t ion 14, 
Sect ion 14 was read and passed 
without amendment. 
1 Qff ic ia l Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 
1895 319 (1898) . 
The development of Utah's search-and-seizure provis ion prior 
t o the adoption of a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 r e f l e c t s a steady 
movement by the drafters toward adoption of the precise wording 
of the fourth amendment (see Appendix B). 
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the Utah Const i tut ion intended that i t be given an in terpre ta t ion 
d i f f erent from that given the fourth amendment. However, the 
State recognizes that the current Court may s t i l l g ive the s t a t e 
provis ion an independent and more protec t ive in terpre ta t ion in 
future cases , perhaps adopting the fol lowing view taken by the 
Miss i ss ippi Supreme Court in a recent case: 
We accord to the U.S. Supreme Court the 
utmost respect in i t s in terpre ta t ion of 
the U.S. Const i tut ion . We must, however, 
reserve for t h i s Court the so l e and abso-
l u t e r ight to make the f ina l in terpretat ion 
of our s t a t e Const i tut ion and, while of 
great persuasion, we w i l l not concede that 
simply because the U.S. Supreme Court may 
interpret a U.S. Const i tut ional provis ion 
that we must give the same in terpreta t ion 
to e s s e n t i a l l y the same words in a pro-
v i s i o n of our s t a t e Const i tu t ion . 
Penick v . S t a t e , 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983) . j3£e also State 
v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, n. 1 , 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 
(1986); S ta te v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633 , 642-43 , 319 S.E.2d 254, 
260 (1981). Neverthe less , the State urges the Court not t o l o s e 
s ight of i t s h i s tory of construing a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 as 
providing the same scope of protect ion as the fourth amendment, 
and the philosophy underlying that h i s t o r y . See, e . g . , State v . 
J a s s o , 21 Utah 2d 24 , 439 P.2d 844 (1968); S ta te v. Cr i sco la , 21 
Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); S tate v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 
(Utah 1976) . It should proceed very caut ious ly in to t h i s new 
t e r r i t o r y . As the Vermont Supreme Court correct ly s ta t ed : 
The development of s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r i s -
prudence w i l l c a l l for the exercise of great 
j u d i c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as well as d i l i g e n c e 
from the t r i a l bar. I t would be a ser ious 
mistake for t h i s Court to use i t s s t a t e con-
s t i t u t i o n c h i e f l y to evade the impact of the 
dec i s i ons of the United S ta te s Supreme Court. 
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Our decisions must be pr incipled, not r e s u l t -
or iented. Jus t i ce Pollock of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court expressed his concern t h i s way: 
M s l t a t e courts should not look to the i r 
cons t i tu t ions only when they wish to reach a 
resu l t different from the United Sta tes Supreme 
Court. That pract ice runs the risk of c r i t i -
cism as being more pragmatic than pr inc ip led ." 
Sta te v. Jewett , 500 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Vt. 1985) (footnote 
c i t a t i o n omitted). A recent opinion from the New Jersey courts 
echoes t h i s concern: 
There are cer ta in dangers inherent in s t a t e 
courts relying too heavily on s t a t e Constitu-
t ions to afford greater protect ion to i t s 
c i t i z e n s . The erosion of national cons t i tu-
t iona l doctrine i s one i l l u s t r a t i o n . We are 
therefore mindful of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
uniformity between the s t a t e and federal 
courts in the in t e rp re t a t ion of pa ra l l e l 
cons t i tu t iona l provis ions. Divergent i n t e r -
pre ta t ions should be avoided unless guide-
l i nes such as those discussed in Sta te v. Hunt* 
91 N.J. a t 358-368, 450 A.2d 952, jus t i fy a 
depar ture . 
State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 239-40, 491 A.2d 37, 43 
(1985). In the Hunt case ci ted by the Novembrino court, Ju s t i ce 
Handler in a concurring opinion ident i f ied the following c r i t e r i a 
for deciding whether to i n t e rp re t the s t a t e cons t i tu t ion 
d i f ferent ly than has the federal cons t i tu t ion : (1) textual 
language; (2) l e g i s l a t i v e h i s to ry ; (3) preexist ing s t a t e law; (4) 
s t ruc tu ra l d i f ferences; (5) matters of pa r t i cu la r s t a t e i n t e r e s t 
or local concern; (6) s t a t e t r a d i t i o n s ; and (7) public a t t i t u d e s . 
This would be a reasonable set of factors for t h i s Court to take 
into account before resor t ing t o independent s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l 
i n t e rp re t a t i on to provide protect ions t ha t are e i ther l e s s 
expansive or nonexistent under the federal cons t i tu t ion . 
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I t i s highly s i g n i f i c a n t tha t , even after the issuance 
of the "suggestive" opinions in Earl and Bygh, the Court 
continues t o re ly s o l e l y on federal precedent in terpret ing the 
fourth amendment in deciding search-and-seizure i s s u e s , with no 
indicat ion that those i s sues might be decided d i f f e r e n t l y under 
a r t i c l e I f s e c t i on 14 or that addit ional br ie f ing on the s t a t e 
cons t i tu t iona l quest ion was necessary. See , e . g . , State v, 
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); S tate v. Ke l ly , 718 
P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986) . Qf^ State v . N ie l sen , 43 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13 , 16 , P.2d , (1986) (noting that "what the 
appropriate remedy might be i f [the defendant] had argued that 
the o f f i c e r 1 s ac t ion v i o l a t e d h i s r ights under a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 
14 of the Utah Const i tut ion i s an open q u e s t i o n " ) . This i s not 
to say that the federal precedents in t h i s area must neces sar i ly 
represent the most s a t i s f a c t o r y reso lut ion of the i s s u e s in a l l 
in s tances , or that a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to search and se izure 
law should never be considered. See Bradley, "Two Models of the 
Fourth Amendment," 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468 (1985) . 6 The point i s 
that t h i s Court w i l l often find an acceptable reso lut ion of a 
search or se izure problem in the federal case law (on both 
^ Professor Bradley, in an e x c e l l e n t a r t i c l e , d i scusses two 
a l t e r n a t i v e models for c l a r i f i c a t i o n of fourth amendment law. He 
argues that adoption of e i ther model would so lve many of the 
problems the Supreme Court has had with search-and-seizure i s s u e s 
and would change a widely held view that "It lhe fourth amendment 
i s the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradic t ions and 
o b s c u r i t i e s that has ensnared the •Brethren' in such a way that 
every e f for t t o ex trac t themselves only f inds them more 
profoundly stuck." 83 Mich. L. Rev. at 1468. 
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phi losophical and public pol icy grounds)/ as i t apparently did in 
Banks and Kelly , and therefore have no reason t o interpret 
a r t i c l e Ir s ec t ion 14 d i f f e r e n t l y , i&e, e . g . . State v . Ouinn, 50 
Or. App. 383/ / 623 P.2d 630/ 638-39 (1981) (adopting federal 
p o s i t i o n for purposes of s ta t e cons t i tu t ion on search-and-seizure 
i s s u e ) ; State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741/ 752/ 653 P.2d 942/ 948 
(1982) ( c i t ing cases where the s t a t e court recognized the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of expanding protect ion under the s ta te cons t i tu t ion 
beyond that required under the federal cons t i tu t ion / but declined 
t o take such a s tep in the given c a s e ) . 
Theretore f when the federal case law provides a well 
reasoned reso lut ion of the i s s u e , the State i s not inc l ined t o 
become immersed in a lengthy discuss ion about whether, as a 
general p r i n c i p l e , a r t i c l e I f s ec t ion 14 could be interpreted 
d i f f e r e n t l y than has the fourth amendment. Rather/ the State 
w i l l indicate that the part icular i s sue should not be decided 
d i f f erent ly on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds and re ly on the 
rat ionale for the pos i t ion provided in the federal precedent and 
s t a t e dec i s ions that have followed i t . ££ . Andrews v. Morris, 
677 P.2d 81/ 88-95 (Utah 1983) (re ly ing heavi ly on federal 
precedent in formulating s t a t e r e t r o a c t i v i t y doc tr ine ) ; Vali 
Convalescent & Care I n s t i t u t i o n v. Industr ia l Commission, 649 
P.2d 33 / 35 (Utah 1982) ("This Court has held that dec i s ions 
r e l a t i n g t o the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
S ta te s Const i tut ion are highly persuasive when interpet ing the 
due process clause of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n . " ) . No violence i s 
done t o the s ta te cons t i tu t ion by "marching lock-s tep" with the 
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federal pos i t ion , State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986) 
(Durham, J . , concurring) , i f that pos i t ion r e f l e c t s the most 
i n t e l l i g e n t analys is of the pa r t i cu la r problem. See* e .g . » 
Cr06grove, 701 P.2d a t 1071-75 (reversing an ea r l i e r decision 
that gave the se l f - incr iminat ion clause of UTAH CONST, art. I , S 
182 a d i f ferent i n t e rp re t a t i on than that given the pa ra l l e l but 
d i f fe ren t ly worded provision in U.S. CONST, amend. V) . The Sta te 
has not taken the posi t ion tha t the Court should never r e j ec t 
federal precedent and decide a search or seizure issue on 
independent s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds; r a the r , i t has 
cons is ten t ly recognized tha t p o s s i b i l i t y in recent b r i e f s to t h i s 
Court. E.g. S ta te v. Mendoza> Case No. 20922, Brief of Appellant 
a t 17-18, Reply Brief of Appellant a t 3-6 (case pending); S ta te 
v. Schlosser, Case No. 860061, Brief of Appellant at 5-6 (case 
pending); S ta te v. Watts, Case No. 860092, Brief of Respondent a t 
10 (case pending). If presented with appropriate fac ts in a 
p a r t i c u l a r case, the Sta te w i l l provide the Court with a fu l l 
ana lys i s of why i t bel ieves a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14 should be 
in te rpre ted d i f fe ren t ly than has the fourth amendment. The Sta te 
i s aware of the po ten t ia l advantages of "c lear -cut ru l e s" in t h i s 
area which wi l l guide, rather than befuddle, law enforcement 
o f f i ce r s and which wi l l avoid " imper i l l ing! both the r igh t s of 
indiv iduals and the i n t e g r i t y and effect iveness of law 
enforcement." Bygh, 711 P.2d a t 272 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring 
s e p a r a t e l y ) . I t i s also aware of the forceful arguments recent ly 
advanced by a number of legal commentators that s t a t e courts 
should more frequently look t o t h e i r s t a t e cons t i tu t ions in 
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resolv ing cons t i tu t iona l i s s u e s . See, e , g , , Williams, "In The 
Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme 
Court Reasoning and Resul t ,* 35 S.C.L. Rev. 353 (1984) j Linde, "E 
Pluribus — Const i tut ional Theory and State Courts," 18 Ga. L. 
Rev. 165 (1984) . Indeed, t h i s subject has received considerable 
a t t en t ion in the l ega l l i t e r a t u r e from numerous wr i ters with 
varying viewpoints on the issue* See State v. Brownr 708 S.W.2d 
140, 147 n. 1 (Mo. 1986) (Well iver, J . , concurring in part and 
d i s sent ing in p a r t ) . 
However, unt i l the State i s convinced that the federal 
search-and-seizure case law (which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y provided the 
bas i s for Utah's search-and-seizure law) i s not acceptable , i t 
w i l l not h e s i t a t e to continue to c i t e t o t h i s Court federal cases 
as support for i t s p o s i t i o n . Presumably, the Court has not been 
d i s s a t i s f i e d with the reasoning of the federal precedents i t has 
r e l i e d upon in deciding search-and-seizure i s s u e s . Furthermore, 
if the part ies in a case have f a i l e d to brief adequately the 
s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l question and the Court be l i eves that the 
defendant i s afforded greater protect ion under a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 
14 than under the fourth amendment, i t seems that the Court would 
have an ob l iga t ion t o request addit ional br i e f ing , reach the 
s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l quest ion, and f u l l y explain what the greater 
protect ion i s . Otherwise, the technical error of inadequate 
br ie f ing i s permitted t o transcend the fundamental cons t i tu t iona l 
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r i g h t s of the c i t i z e n r y . See Jewett t 500 A.2d at 238 . 7 
Fina l ly , although the Court may in some instances be 
j u s t i f i a b l y concerned that "the ana lys i s of s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l 
i s s u e s in criminal appeals continues to be ignored," Ear l . 716 
P.2d a t 806, i t should remember that i t has decided numerous 
s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l quest ions in recent criminal c a s e s . In 
f a c t , the Court has frequently disposed of the quest ion by 
concluding with l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n that , e i ther in the given case 
or as a general p r i n c i p l e , the s t a t e provis ion has the same scope 
of protect ion as i t s federal counterpart. See> e . g . , S ta te v» 
Nelson, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 , P.2d , (1986) 
(admission of hearsay statements not a v i o l a t i o n of the right to 
confrontat ion under e i ther U.S. CONST, amend. VI or UTAH CONST, 
a r t . I , S 1 2 ) ; S tate v. Schreuder, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 52 , 
P.2d , (1986) (rule that admission of out-of -court 
statements under the circumstances of the case created no 
confrontation problem i s same under federal and s t a t e 
7
 The State maintains the p o s i t i o n i t took in State v . Mendoza, 
Case No. 20922, Reply Brief of Appellant at 4 (case pending) 
tha t , because the reso lut ion of search-and-seizure i s s u e s on 
s ta te c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds would mark a clear departure from 
past p r a c t i c e , the Court should not address the s t a t e law issue 
without the benef i t of br ie f ing from the p a r t i e s . £f . S ta te v. 
Bishop, 717 P.2d at 272 (Durham, J . , concurring) (where Jus t i ce 
Durham suggests that , even in the absence of br ie f ing by the 
p a r t i e s , the Court could address an issue under the s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n sua sponte ) . Indeed, the Court should rare ly , i f 
ever , raise and address an issue sua sponte in any criminal 
appeal . £LL Sta te v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980) (where 
the Court, without asking for additional br ie f ing from the 
p a r t i e s , deal t with an ins t ruc t iona l i s sue in a cap i ta l case that 
was not raised by the defendant in the t r i a l court (or on 
appeal ) . A request by the Court for further br ie f ing would be 
preferable . 
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cons t i tu t ion ) j g t a t e v Banks
 f 720 P.2d at 1385 ( interpret ing in 
para l l e l fashion the speedy- tr ia l provisions contained in UTAH 
CONST, ar t . I , S 12 and U.S. CONST, amend. VI); g ta te v . Bishop, 
717 P.2d at 265-67 (holding that "the Utah and the federal cruel 
and unusual punishment provis ions apply to t h i s case in the same 
fashion;* and equal protect ion ana lys i s same under s t a t e and 
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; g t a t e v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d at 267 (holding 
that , as under federal law, inventory searches are permitted by 
UTAH CONST, art . I , S 14); g t a t e v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1343 
(Utah 1984) (holding that , in the context of the instant c a s e , 
• A r t i c l e I , S 9 [of the Utah Const i tut ion] does not give the 
defendant more extens ive protect ions than those afforded by the 
Eighth Amendment"); S tate v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-06 (Utah 
1984) ( i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel ana lys i s same under UTAH 
CONST, art . I , S 12 and U.S. CONST, amend. VI); State v . Norton, 
675 P.2d 577, 585 n. 5 (Utah 1983) , c e r t , denied, 466 U.S. 942 
(1984) ("This Court recognizes no d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
protect ion against ex post fac to laws provided by the Utah and 
the United S ta tes Const i tut ions") ; McNair v . Hayward, 666 P.2d 
321 , 323 (Utah 1983) (the double jeopardy provis ions of U.S. 
CONST, amend V and of UTAH CONST, ar t . I , S 12 "have the same 
content") . Impl ic i t in these dec i s ions i s that a de ta i l ed 
independent ana lys i s of the s ta t e cons t i tu t iona l provis ions i s in 
©any cases unnecessary. Cf. S ta te v. T u t t l e , 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 
1985) ( re jec t ing E s t e l l e v . Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975) , and 
holding that , under UTAH CONST, a r t . I , § 12, defendant was 
e n t i t l e d t o have h i s appeal re instated after having escaped) . 
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Here, defendant advances no compelling arguments in 
support of the proposit ion that a r t i c l e I f s ec t ion 14 demands 
adoption of the Aguil a r - S p i n e l l i t e s t and r e j e c t i o n of the Gates 
t e s t . For the reasons stated by the majority in Gates, the 
t o t a l i t y of the circumstances approach to determining the 
su f f i c i ency of an informant-based warrant i s far more reasonable 
and useful "than i s any r ig id demand that s p e c i f i c • t e s t s ' be 
s a t i s f i e d by every informant's t i p , " 462 U.S. at 230-31. 
Furthermore, an i n d i v i d u a l ' s privacy i n t e r e s t s are not 
compromised when i t i s appl ied. Therefore, i f the i s sue i s 
addressed in the context of t h i s case , the Court should continue 
t o fol low the Gates-type approach i t employed in Anderson when 
in terpret ing a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 1 4 . In f a c t , t h i s appears t o be 
the precise course the Court has chosen t o fo l l ow . See State v. 
EsPinoza, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 3 , 2 4 , P.2d , (1986) . Cf. 
People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986) (adopting Gates 
t e s t for purposes of s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s search-and-seizure 
p r o v i s i o n ) ; S ta te v. Lang. 105 Idaho 683 , 672 P.2d 561 (1983) 
(adopting Gates as s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l ru le ) ; S ta te v. Jackson, 
688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984) ( re j ec t ing Gates and reta in ing Agui lar-
S p i n e l l i t e s t on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds). 
Based upon the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , the search warrant 
was supported by the probable cause, and therefore the t r i a l 
court was not required to suppress the challenged evidence under 
Utah R. Crira. P. 12(g) which, as discussed in subsect ion B, i s 
the contro l l ing rule for suppression i s sues concerning an 
a l l e g e d l y unlawful search or s e i zure . 
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B. pule 12(g) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As part of his argument on appeal, defendant contends 
that the evidence he challenges should have been excluded under 
Otah R. Crim P. 12(g) . 8 Although defendant does not challenge 
the appropriateness or cons t i t u t iona l i t y of Rule 12(g), given 
that t h i s Court has never fully discussed the ru le , the Sta te 
wi l l f i r s t examine the current s t a tus of t h i s modified 
exclusionary rule in Utah fs criminal jus t i ce system. The 
question of whether exclusion was required under Rule 12(g) wi l l 
then be addressed. 
8 Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admiss ib i l i ty of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant to t h i s section or a t t r i a l , 
upon grounds of unlawful search and se izure , the suppression of 
evidence shall not be granted unless the court finds the 
v io la t ion upon which i t i s based t o be both a substant ia l 
v io la t ion and not committed in good f a i t h . The court shall set 
forth i t s reasons for such f inding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in a l l cases be deemed 
subs tan t ia l if one or more of the following i s es tabl ished by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The v io la t ion was grossly negligent , w i l l fu l , malicious, 
shocking to the conscience of the court or was a resu l t of the 
pract ice of the law enforcement agency pursuant to a general 
order of tha t agency; 
( i i ) The v io la t ion was intended only to harass without 
l eg i t imate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was act ing in good 
fa i th under t h i s sect ion, the court shal l consider, in addit ion 
to any other relevant f ac to r s , some or a l l of the following: ( i ) The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure 
s tandards ; 
( i i ) The extent t o which exclusion wi l l tend to deter future 
v io l a t i ons of search and seizure standards; 
( i i i ) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, a r r e s t warrant, or relying on previous speci f ic 
d i rec t ions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant es tab l i shes tha t the search 
or se izure was unlawful and subs tan t ia l by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must then, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good fa i th act ions of 
the peace of f icer . 
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At the outse t , i t i s necessary to summarize the 
l e g i s l a t i v e his tory of Rule 12(g) and t h i s Court1 s treatment of 
i t in the case law. In 1982, the l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Rule 12(g) 
as part of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act (1982 Utah Laws 
ch« 1 0 , SS 1-16) • During the time that Rule 12(g) operated as a 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rule of criminal procedure, t h i s Court 
never ruled upon i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , gee State v . Anderson, 
701 P.2d at 1103. In September 1985, the Court in In Re; Rules 
of Procedure, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) , adopted a l l e x i s t i n g 
s tatutory rules of procedure not incons i s t en t with procedural 
ru les previously adopted by the Court. This administrat ive 
rul ing was made in response to the amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII , 
s ec t ion 4 of the Utah Const i tut ion 9 which were approved by the 
v o t e r s in November 1984 and became e f f e c t i v e on July 1 , 1985. 
See Compi lers Notes, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, Replacement Vol . 1A at 
58 (Supp. 1986) . The amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the Court's rule-making author i ty , which had 
previously only been accorded by s t a t u t e . See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-4 (1977) (amended 1986); 1943 Utah Laws ch. 3 3 , § 1 (which 
gave the Court rule-making power in a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s ) . Since 
rece iv ing f u l l rule-making power in 1943, the Court apparently 
9
 A r t i c l e VIII , s ec t ion 4 now provides in pert inent part: 
The supreme court shal l adopt ru l e s of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the s t a t e 
and shal l by ru le manage the appel late process . The 
l e g i s l a t u r e may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of a l l members of both houses of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . . . . 
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has never independently devised and adopted rules of criminal 
procedure; the l e g i s l a t u r e has h i s t o r i c a l l y performed t h i s task. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 105-1-1 fit fieg- (1943); UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-
1-1 fit £££• (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-1-1 fit £fi3* (1978); UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 77-35-1 fit ££fl. ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 1 0 This has not been the case 
with the ru les of c i v i l procedure or the ru les of evidence. See 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1332-33 (Utah 1986); Brickyard 
Homeowners' Ass 'n . v. Gibbons Realty; 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 
1983) . In Re: Rules of Procedure marks the f i r s t time that the 
Court has independently adopted rules of criminal procedure; and 
i t did so through an apparent wholesale adoption of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rules contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 
fit seq . (1982). There being no previously Court-adopted rules of 
criminal procedure, the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s ru les presumably are now 
the Court's rules—unqual i f ied . Therefore, the State i s 
proceeding on the assumption that Rule 12(g) i s in place as a 
rule of criminal procedure formally adopted by t h i s Court, and 
that i t i s the contro l l ing rule for a l l motions t o suppress 
evidence for an a l l eged ly unlawful search or s e i z u r e . See State 
v . Hygh# 711 P.2d at 273 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring separately) 
(•I have found no case in which t h i s Court has decided t o adopt 
the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the quest ion 
of what remedy i s avai lable for an unlawful search or seizure 
10 In 1980, the l e g i s l a t u r e , for 
designated the ru les of criminal 
chapter 35 of t i t l e 77 . 
the f i r s t t ime, s p e c i f i c a l l y 
procedure and se t them apart in 
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under our s t a t e cons t i tu t ion") . H 
Having said t h i s , two issues require t h i s Court ' s 
considera t ion: (1) To what extent i s the t r a d i t i o n a l 
exclusionary ru le required under the federal cons t i tu t ion or the 
state cons t i tu t ion? (2) I s Rule 12(g) , the Court ' s rule f a 
permissible remedy for a v io la t ion of the accused 's r ights under 
the fourth amendment and a r t i c l e I , section 14? These issues are 
raised by the State because t h i s Court has never ful ly discussed 
i t s r a t i ona l e for applying an exclusionary rule for unlawful 
searches and seizures in cases prior t o i t s adoption of Rule 
12(g) , or disclosed i t s r a t iona le for adopting Rule 12(g) , which 
represents a clear departure from the exclusionary rule the Court 
has t r a d i t i o n a l l y applied. The S ta te simply offers the following 
ana lys i s as support for the Court ' s adoption of Rule 12(g) . 
The S t a t e ' s approach to these issues w i l l not be an 
or ig inal one. Four helpful law review a r t i c l e s on the 
exclusionary rule wi l l be re l i ed upon in developing the 
discussion tha t follows—Coe, "The ALI Subs tan t i a l i ty Test : A 
Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction," 10 Ga. L. Rev. 1 
(1975); Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule," 26 Stan . 
L. Rev. 1027 (1974); Schroeder, "Deterring Fourth Amendment 
Vio la t ions : Al ternat ives to the Exclusionary Rule," 69 Geo. L.J . 
1361 (1981); and Stewart, "The Road t o Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: 
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1983). The 
H Jus t ice Zimmerman's concurrence was issued pr ior to the 
issuance of In Re: Rules of Procedure. 
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focus here w i l l be s l i g h t l y d i f ferent from that in other b r i e f s 
on the subject recent ly f i l e d by the State in State v. Mendoza, 
Case No. 20922, a case currently pending before the Court. 
Although the ftendoza br ie f s provide a good s tar t ing point for a 
d i scuss ion of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , they do not address pertinent quest ions 
regarding the necess i ty of an exclusionary rule under our s ta te 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . Accordingly, the State urges the Court to consider 
the S t a t e 1 s arguments in Mendoza in l i g h t of the discuss ion of 
Rule 12(g) presented here. 
Three Supreme Court cases are general ly credited with 
producing the exclusionary rule—Boyd v. United S t a t e s , 116 U.S. 
616 (1886); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Weeks v . 
United S t a t e s , 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The f a i r l y narrow rule that 
emerged from that t r i l ogy of cases was s i g n i f i c a n t l y broadened in 
subsequent cases , culminating in Agnello v. United S t a t e s , 269 
U.S. 20 (1925), which held that contraband se ized in v i o l a t i o n of 
the fourth amendment could not be used as evidence in a federal 
criminal t r i a l . However, none of the Court's opinions c l ear ly 
i d e n t i f i e d the doctrinal bas i s for the exclusionary ru le . Then 
in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) , the Court made clear 
that the securi ty of one f s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the pol ice i s "implic i t in the concept of ordered l i b e r t y , " and 
therefore enforceable against the s t a t e s through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although i t for the f i r s t 
time e x p l i c i t l y treated the quest ion of the exc lus ion of 
i l l e g a l l y se ized evidence as a matter of remedies, apart from the 
right secured by the fourth amendment, the Court in Wolf refused 
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t o impose the federa l ly fashioned exclusionary rule on the s t a t e s 
as the part icular remedy for uncons t i tu t iona l ly se ized evidence. 
The Wolf majority recognized that other "equally e f f e c t i v e " s t a t e 
methods for deterring unreasonable searches and se i zures would 
s u f f i c e . 338 U.S. at 3 1 . 
However, in 1961 the Court in Mapp v . Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) , overruled the pertinent port ions of Wolf and held 
that the exclusionary rule was appl icable to s t a t e criminal 
prosecut ions: 
Today we once again examine Wolf1 s c o n s t i t u -
t ional documentation of the right to privacy 
from unreasonable s t a t e intrus ion f and, 
after i t s dozen years on our books, are l ed 
by i t to c lose the only courtroom door re-
maining open t o evidence secured by o f f i c i a l 
lawlessness in f lagrant abuse of that basic 
r ight , reserved t o a l l persons as a s p e c i f i c 
guarantee against that very same unlawful 
conduct. We hold that a l l evidence obtained 
by searches and se i zures in v i o l a t i o n of the 
Const i tut ion i s , by that same author i ty , 
inadmiss ible in a s t a t e court. 
367 U.S. at 654-55. F ina l ly , in a recent dec i s ion the Lourc 
c l e a r l y rejected the premise upon which Mapp seemed t o res t— 
i . e . , that the exclusionary rule was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required 
remedy. In United S t a t e s v . Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , i t 
s t a t e d : 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provis ion 
express ly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands, and 
an examination of i t s or ig in and purposes 
makes c lear that the use of f r u i t s of a 
past unlawful search or se izure "work Is] no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong." United S t a t e s 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment i s "ful ly 
accomplished" by the unlawful search or 
se izure i t s e l f , i b i d . , and the exclusionary 
rule i s nei ther intended nor able to "cure 
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the invasion of the defendant 's r i gh t s which 
he has already suffered." gtone v. Powell, 
supra, at 540 (WHITE, J , , d i s sen t ing ) . The 
ru le thus operates as "a j ud ic i a l ly created jremedy designed to safeguard Four.tli^gJldjnent 
r i ght^^ejp^j^ii^_thipuah^i^-^Jl€t ^ju;&nt_efie ct i 
xatti&i than a persojLal,^gp^titiitij?n_aJLjlght 
&f,Jfche_^ P£JLS£J eggr jeyg^" United S ta tes v. 
Calandra, supra, a t 348. 
468 U.S. at 906 (emphasis added). Thus, now that i t i s s e t t l ed 
that the exclusionary ru le i s not required by the federal 
cons t i tu t ion , the immediate question confronting s t a t e appel late 
courts i s whether the ru le i s required by the i r individual s t a t e 
cons t i t u t i ons . 
As with the fourth amendment, a r t i c l e I , section 14 
contains no provision expressly excluding from a criminal t r i a l 
evidence tha t has been obtained in v io la t ion of i t s commands. 
Prior to the Supreme Court fs decision in Mapp, which extended the 
federal exclusionary rule to s t a t e criminal prosecutions, t h i s 
Court, after a de ta i led ana lys is of the quest ion, expressly held 
tha t evidence should not be excluded even though i t was obtained 
as a r e su l t of an i l l e g a l search and se izure . S ta te v. Aime, 62 
Utah 476, 478-&5, 220 P. 704, 705-08 (1923). S^e also State v. 
Fa i r , 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615 (1960). This posi t ion was in 
l ine with the majority view held by s t a t e courts a t tha t time. 
Aime, 62 Utah a t 480-81, 220 P. a t 706. I t was not un t i l Mapp 
had been decided tha t the Court recognized exclusion as the 
remedy for a v io la t ion of the fourth amendment or a r t i c l e I , 
sect ion 14. State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 66, 387 P.2d 240, 
-29-
241-42 (1963) , vacated on other grounds, 379 U.S. 1 (1964) .12 
Since Louden, the Court has f a i t h f u l l y applied the f e d e r a l l y 
fashioned exclusionary rule in criminal c a s e s . E.g. State v . 
Ga l l egos , 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985); S ta te v. Harris , 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983) . However, the Supreme Court's s i g n i f i c a n t 
modif icat ion of that ru le in Leon* coupled with i t s clear 
statement there that the rule i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required, 
g ives t h i s Court every reason t o f u l l y d i scuss the neces s i ty of 
an exclusionary rule under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n and t o explain 
why the recent ly adopted Rule 12(g) i s an appropriate r u l e . 
Three major ra t iona le s for the exclusionary rule in 
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and l e g a l 
l i t e r a t u r e : (1) the remedial or personal right r a t i o n a l e ; (2) 
the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y r a t i o n a l e ; and (3) the deterrence 
r a t i o n a l e . Coe, supra at 14 -24 . Although a lengthy d i scuss ion 
of each of these r a t i o n a l e s i s not poss ib l e here f some a t t e n t i o n 
should be given them so that a foundation may be l a i d for a 
meaningful a n a l y s i s of Rule 12(g)—a rule which re ta ins exc lus ion 
as a remedy where the search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n i s both 
subs tant ia l and not committed in good f a i t h . See Rule 1 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) . 
12 Louden could be read as adopting the exclusionary rule as the 
s o l e remedy for an unlawful search or se izure under the s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . However, by simply c i t i n g t o Mapp, the Court 
appears t o have lumped the s t a t e and federal provis ions together 
without g iv ing much thought to the independent s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ques t ion . Therefore, the State b e l i e v e s that 
J u s t i c e Zimmerman was correct in Hygh when he observed that there 
appeared to be 'no case in which t h i s Court hafd] decided to 
adopt the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the 
quest ion of what remedy i s ava i lab le for unlawful search or 
se izure under our State Cons t i tu t ion ." 711 P.2d at 273 . 
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The remedial or personal right rat ionale embraces the 
notion that the exc lus ion of evidence i s a right inherent in the 
personal cons t i tu t iona l right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and s e i z u r e s . However, despite some degree of support, 
the remedial or compensatory j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary 
rule has general ly been re jec ted . Coe, supra at 15; Schroeder, 
supra at 1426. put see fftate v . Johnson, 716 P.2d at 1297 n. 11; 
S tate v. Grawein, 123 Wis.2d 428, 431-32, 367 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 
(Wis. App. 1985) ( c i t ing State v. Kreigbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 232 , 
215 N.W. 896, 897-98 (1927)) ; State v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92, 110, 
640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982). A frequently c i t e d flaw in t h i s 
theory i s that the t ex t of the fourth amendment does not d i r e c t l y 
require exc lus ion; nor i s there anything in the events giving 
r i s e t o the adoption of the fourth amendment that supports the 
view that i t was intended to require exc lus ion . Stewart, supra 
at 1381. As noted e a r l i e r , the Supreme Court c lear ly re jected 
t h i s theory in Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Because a r t i c l e I , sec t ion 
14, l i k e the fourth amendment, contains no textual requirement 
for exclusion and there appears t o be nothing in the his tory of 
i t s adoption t o indicate that exc lus ion of evidence would be 
required for a v i o l a t i o n of the provis ion, t h i s Court should 
again r e j e c t the remedial or personal right rat ionale as a 
cons t i tu t iona l bas i s for the exclusionary rule , as i t did, for 
a l l pract ica l purposes, in Aime, 62 Utah at 480-85, 220 P. 706-
08 . 
The theory that exclus ion i s necessary to preserve 
j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y has a l so received much c r i t i c i s m and has 
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generally played only a minor ro le in the development of the 
exclusionary r u l e . Coe, supra a t 17. The notion underlying t h i s 
theory was perhaps best a r t i cu l a t ed in the dissent of Jus t i ce 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United S t a t e s , 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J . , d i s sen t ing ) : 
Our Government i s the potent , the omnipresent 
teacher . For good or for i l l , i t teaches the 
whole people by i t s example. . . . If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, i t breeds 
contempt for law; i t i nv i t e s every man to 
become a law unto himself; i t i n v i t e s anarchy. 
In t h a t same case, Just ice Holmes wrote in h i s dissent ing 
opinion: 
We have to choose, and for my par t I think 
i t l e s s evil that some criminals should 
escape than tha t the Government should play 
an ignoble pa r t . 
277 U.S. a t 470. 
Although some courts continue to recognize the jud ic i a l 
i n t e g r i t y r a t iona le as the most compelling j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
exclusionary ru le , see # e .g . * State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. 
Super, a t 244, 491 A.2d a t 45, i t i s subject t o the same a t tack 
as i s the personal r ight r a t i o n a l e — i . e . , there appears t o be no 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for i t , e i ther t ex tua l ly or h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Stewart, supra at 1383. His to r i ca l ly , courts have in a var ie ty 
of circumstances admitted i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence, apparently 
not overly concerned t h a t to do so would necessar i ly involve the 
court in "dir ty bus iness ." Ib id , i fftone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
486 (1976) (observing tha t the fourth amendment "has never been 
in te rpre ted to proscribe the introduct ion of i l l e g a l l y seized 
evidence in a l l proceedings or against a l l persons") ; Coe, supra 
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at 17 . This c r i t i c i sm appears sound, and although there i s a 
good deal of merit t o the value judgment inherent in the j u d i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y doctr ine , i t does not provide a sound const i tu t iona l 
bas i s for the exclusionary ru le . Indeed, the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y 
ra t iona le was e x p l i c i t l y rejected as an independent 
cons t i tu t iona l bas i s for the exclusionary rule by the Supreme 
Court in Michigan v . Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 n. 25 (1974) . The 
t e x t and history of a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 demand no d i f f erent 
conclusion by t h i s Court. 
The deterrence rat ionale i s with l i t t l e doubt the most 
widely accepted j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary ru le . In 
Leon, the Supreme Court made clear that i t perceived deterrence 
as the only purpose for the r u l e . 468 U.S. at 906. Numerous 
s t a t e courts have taken a s imilar pos i t ion regarding the i r own 
exclusionary r u l e s . See* e . g . , Mers v. State* 482 N.E.2d 778, 
782-83 (Ind. App. 1985); S ta te v. Wood, 457 So.2d 206, 210-11 
(La. App. 1984); State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 
674, 678-79 (1981) , cer t , denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (recognizing 
that , although other reasons for i t s use e x i s t , the primary 
purpose of Idaho's exclusionary rule i s t o deter pol ice 
misconduct). The Leon dec i s ion and a number of s ta te court 
opinions, e . g . State v . Brown, 708 So.2d at 146; Stringer v . 
S t a t e , 491 So.2d 837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J . , 
concurring) , r e f l ec t the majority, and probably better reasoned, 
view that the deterrence ra t iona le , l i k e the other r a t i o n a l e s , 
has no readi ly d i scern ib le bas is in the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n or 
the s ta te c o n s t i t u t i o n s . On the other hand, J u s t i c e Potter 
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Stewart has a r t i c u l a t e d what i s perhaps the most compelling 
counterargument to that view: 
To give e f fec t t o the Cons t i tu t ion ' s prohi-
b i t i on against i l l e g a l searches and s e i z u r e s , 
i t may be necessary for the judic iary to 
remove the incent ive for v i o l a t i n g i t . Thus, 
i t may be argued that although the Const i tu-
t ion does not e x p l i c i t l y provide for e x c l u -
s ion , the need t o enforce the Cons t i tu t ion ' s 
l i m i t s on government—to preserve the rule 
of law—requires an exclusionary rule . Under 
t h i s third "doctrinal" bas i s for the exc lu -
sionary rule , which has been described as 
"const i tut ional common law," the exc lus ion of 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly obtained evidence i s not 
a cons t i tu t iona l right but a cons t i tu t iona l 
remedy. It i s a r ight only in the sense 
that every remedy v e s t s a right in those 
who may claim i t . 
Stewart, supra at 1384. But even he q u a l i f i e d h i s argument by 
s t a t i n g : 
Under such an approach, the determination 
whether the exclusionary rule i s c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l l y required turns on whether there are 
other adequate remedies avai lable t o ensure 
that the government does not v i o l a t e the 
fourth amendment at i t s p leasure . 
Ibid. 
Assuming that t h i s Court i s among those courts that see 
deterrence of p o l i c e misconduct as the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary rule , a reasonable assumption given i t s recent 
adoption of Rule 12(g) (which, as discussed in more d e t a i l below, 
i s a deterrence-or iented, modified exclusionary r u l e ) , the Court 
should e x p l i c i t l y hold that an exclusionary r u l e , in any form, i s 
not required e i ther by a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 1 4 , or any other 
provis ion in the s ta t e c o n s t i t u t i o n , on a theory that exc lus ion 
i s a cons t i tu t iona l remedy premised upon the deterrence doctr ine . 
Although J u s t i c e Stewart's cons t i tu t iona l theory regarding the 
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deterrence rat iona le i s not without some force , by adopting i t 
the Court would unnecessarily entangle i t s e l f in a l e s s than 
c lear const i tu t iona l ana lys i s . Elevating a quest ion in to the 
realm of a cons t i tu t iona l quest ion , when that i s avoidable, i s 
not the preferred course* See State v. Wood > 648 P.2d 71 , 82 
(Utah 1982) , cert* denied, 459 U.S. 988. The preferable course 
for t h i s Court would be to do as the Supreme Court did in Leon 
and recognize that t h i s s t a t e ' s exclusionary rule—which i s 
embodied in Rule 12(g)—operates as a j u d i c i a l l y created remedy 
designed to safeguard a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 r ights through i t s 
deterrent e f f e c t , rather than a personal cons t i tu t iona l right of 
the aggrieved person. See Leonf 468 U.S. at 906. Under t h i s 
approach, future modif icat ions of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , including the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t o t a l l y abandoning exc lus ion of evidence as a 
remedy for search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n s , are more e a s i l y 
analyzed and adopted.13 
F ina l ly , although the Court might a l so embrace the 
j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y rat ionale as an addit ional nonconst i tut ional 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary rule, s e e , e . g . , Johnson > 716 
P.2d at 1298, that would not be completely cons i s tent with the 
tenor of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which al lows the admission of i l l e g a l l y 
obtained evidence so long as the v i o l a t i o n was insubstant ia l and 
committed in good f a i t h . In short , of the three that have been 
1 J
 For instance , i f the Court were to conclude at some future 
date that adequate a l t erna t ive remedies to the exclusionary rule 
e x i s t , i t could simply abandon the rule through i t s rule-making 
function without having to explain why a rule once required by 
the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n was no longer so required. 
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discussed , the deterrence ra t iona le , viewed as a 
nonconst i tut ional doctr ine , provides the c l e a r e s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the exclusionary rule contained in Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
Having addressed the quest ion of whether an 
exclusionary rule i s required under e i ther the fourth amendment 
or a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 14, the next quest ion i s whether Rule 12(g) 
i s a permiss ible remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of a defendant's r i g h t s 
under the federal and s ta te prov i s ions . Because a s t a t e i s free 
t o fashion whatever rule i t des i res concerning v i o l a t i o n s of i t s 
s ta t e cons t i tu t iona l provis ion that are not a l so v i o l a t i o n s of 
the fourth amendment, the ana lys i s of t h i s i s sue w i l l focus on 
whether Rule 12(g) provides a permiss ible remedy for v i o l a t i o n s 
of the fourth amendment. By proceeding in t h i s way, the State i s 
assuming that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , b e l i e v e s i t to 
be an acceptable rule under s t a t e law for v i o l a t i o n s of a r t i c l e 
I , s ec t ion 14. Thus, if the Court were to determine that certa in 
po l i ce conduct v i o l a t e d a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 14 even though i t did 
not v i o l a t e the fourth amendment, presumably Rule 12(g) would be 
the contro l l ing rule on the i ssue of suppression. 
Under the Happ ru l ing , as modified by Leon> the 
individual s t a t e s are obl igated t o apply the federal exclusionary 
ru le in cases of a fourth amendment v i o l a t i o n . If federal law 
requires exc lus ion under the f a c t s presented, the s t a t e court 
roust exclude the evidence. In short , a s t a t e may not have a more 
narrow exclusionary rule than the federal rule when a fourth 
amendment v i o l a t i o n i s a t i s s u e . Str inger v. State# 491 So.2d at 
847 (Robertson, J . , concurring) . Therefore, i t must be 
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determined whether Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which obviously appl ies t o 
v i o l a t i o n s of the fourth amendment, can be applied in a manner 
cons i s tent with federal law. 
Rule 12(g) appears t o be a hybrid rule which combines 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t suggested by the American Law I n s t i t u t e 
i n i t s MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE ( 1 9 7 5 ) , see 
general ly Coe, supra, and the good f a i t h exception to the 
exclusionary rule ar t i cu la ted by the Supreme Court in Leon 
(warrant context) and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United S ta te s v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) , cer t , 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (warrantless contex t ) . I t r e f l e c t s 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with automatic exclus ion (which does not consider 
what deterrent e f f e c t , if any, exc lus ion w i l l have in the given 
case) as the remedy for every search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n , the 
cos t s of which can be extremely high. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08; 
Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. at 490 ("The d ispar i ty in part icular 
cases between the error committed by the po l ice o f f i cer and the 
windfal l afforded a g u i l t y defendant by appl icat ion of the rule 
i s contrary t o the idea of proport ional i ty that i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
the concept of j u s t i c e . " ) ; Schroeder, supra at 1424-25 
(summarizing the perceived cos t s of the exclusionary rule as 
fo l lows: "(1) fos ter ing delay in the system of j u s t i c e ; (2) 
encouraging pol ice perjury; (3) d ivert ing the a t t en t ion of the 
par t i c ipants in a criminal case from the quest ion of g u i l t or 
innocence; (4) free ing the g u i l t y ; and (5) generating d i srespect 
for the law and the administration of j u s t i c e by granting 
windfal l benef i t s to certain gu i l ty defendants" (footnote 
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c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ) . Instead, i t re ta ins exc lus ion as a remedy 
for a substant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n , recognizing that a 
benef ic ia l deterrent e f f ec t i s rea l i zed through exclus ion only 
under appropriate circumstances. Thus, Rule 12(g) embraces a 
p r i n c i p l e that was central to the dec i s ion in Leon: avoidance of 
the high c o s t s of the exclusionary rule where exc lus ion would not 
e f f e c t i v e l y deter po l ice misconduct. As s ta ted in Leon: 
[Elven assuming that the rule e f f e c t i v e l y 
de ters some pol ice misconduct and provides 
i n c e n t i v e s for the law enforcement profess ion 
as a whole to conduct i t s e l f in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, i t cannot be expected, 
and should not be applied, to deter object -
ive ly reasonable law enforcement a c t i v i t y . 
468 U.S. at 918-19. £ f . Stewart, supra at 1394 n. 155; Oaks, 
•Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Se izure ," 37 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 665 ( 1 9 7 0 ) — c r i t i c s of the exclusionary rule who 
f o r c e f u l l y argue that i t does not in fact deter unconst i tut ional 
po l ice conduct. Addi t ional ly , because the rule operates in 
conjunction with UTAH CODE ANN. SS 78-16-1 through -11 (Supp. 
1986) , which provide a c i v i l remedy for the defendant whose 
cons t i tu t iona l r ights have been v io la ted ,14 i t s mandate for 
l imi t ed exc lus ion i s cons i s tent with the wel l reasoned view that , 
i f adequate a l t e r n a t i v e remedies e x i s t , exc lus ion becomes l e s s 
necessary. See Bivens v . Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents* 
403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J . , d i s sent ing) (out l in ing 
an a l t e r n a t i v e remedial scheme to the exclusionary r u l e ) . 
1* An aggrieved defendant could a l s o seek damages from the pol ice 
o f f i cer under the federal Civ i l Rights Act , 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
(1982) . 
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Although the language of Rule 12(g) does not precisely 
track the good fa i th exception a r t i cu la t ed in Leon and Williams, 
the g i s t of Utah's subs t an t i a l i t y /good fa i th rule i s the same as 
that set out in those cases ; and th i s Court, through case law, 
can ensure tha t i t i s applied in a manner consistent with federal 
law.15 p o r ins tance, in Leon t;he Court a t one point s ta ted in 
reference to appl ica t ion of the exclusionary ru le : 
Par t i cu la r ly when law enforcement off icers 
have acted jn objective good fa i th or the i r 
t ransgressions have been minor , the magnitude 
of the benefit conferred on such gui l ty defen-
dants offends basic concepts of the criminal j u s t i ce system. 
468 U.S. at 907-08 (c i t ing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490) 
(emphasis added). I t further noted: 
The Court has, to be sure, not seriously ques-
tioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued appl icat ion of the rule 
to suppress evidence from the [prosecution 's] 
case where a Fourth Amendment v io la t ion has 
been subs tan t ia l and del iberate* . . . " Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. 
Powellt supra, a t 492. 
*
5
 Some of the quest ions t ha t were asked the S t a t e ' s counsel 
during oral argument in S ta te v. Mendoza, Case No. 20922 (argued 
June 12, 1986), suggest t ha t cer ta in members of the Court may not 
be en t i r e ly s a t i s f i ed with the language of Rule 12(g). However, 
i t i s the Court fs ru le , and if the rule i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
worded, the Court should amend i t . Aware of the possible 
concerns in t h i s regard, a t torneys from the Attorney General1 s 
Office plan to meet with representa t ives from the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutors and other members of the law 
enforcement community to discuss Rule 12(g) and perhaps pe t i t i on 
for a ru le change, as the S ta te has done with respect to Utah R. 
Crim. P. 27 (see In Re: Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, S t a t e ' s Pe t i t ion for Amendment to Rule (f i led February 
19 , 1986)). If such a pe t i t i on i s f i l e d , the S ta te wi l l a t tha t 
same time submit a complete memorandum discussing the 
exclusionary ru le and possible a l t e rna t ives to i t . But for now, 
the S ta te recognizes t ha t the Court has adopted current Rule 
12(g) , and therefore wi l l l imi t i t s discussion here to the legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for tha t r u l e . 
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i f l . at 908-09 (emphasis added). ££e also McFarland v . S t a t e . 284 
Ark. 533, 549, 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1985) ( c i t i n g hssm with 
approval in applying ArKansas's substant ia l v i o l a t i o n rule for 
suppression of evidence (A.R.Cr.P. 16 .2 (e )—a rule patterned 
a f ter the ALI's s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t ) ) . 
Furthermore, that the Supreme Court has not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y held that the Leon good f a i t h exception would apply 
in a warrantless context , as Rule 12(g) obviously would, the 
Court's general d i scuss ion in that case about the propriety of a 
good f a i t h exception strongly suggests that such an extens ion of 
Leon would be both acceptable and des i rab le . See 468 U.S. at 
918-19. 
Some courts have adopted a form of good f a i t h exception 
t o the exclusionary rule in a warrantless search or se izure 
context . See, e . g . , United S t a t e s v . Wyler, 502 F.Supp. 969, 
973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) . The leading case i s s t i l l Williams where 
the Fifth Circuit held that evidence se ized from the defendant 
inc ident t o a warrantless a r r e s t , which was ul t imate ly determined 
to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because "evidence 
i s not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where i t i s 
discovered by o f f i c e r s in the course of act ions that are taken in 
good f a i t h and in the reasonable, though mistaken, be l i e f that 
they are authorized." 622 F.2d at 840. The court analyzed the 
appropriateness of a good f a i t h except ion in much the same way 
that the Supreme Court did in Leon, emphasizing that the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule i s not furthered if 
the rule i s applied to s i t u a t i o n s where po l ice o f f i c e r s have 
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acted in the good fa i th be l ie f that the ir conduct i s lawful . 622 
F.2d at 842. Numerous courts have c i t ed Williams with approval. 
E.g. United S ta te s v . Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (10th Cir. 
1985) i Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co. , 695 F.2d 
1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1982); United S ta te s v . Nolan, 530 
F.Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981) , a f f f d , 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 
1983); S ta te v . Verkuylen, 120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 
App. 1982); State v. Glass , 9 Ohio Misc.2d 10 , 1 1 , 458 N.E.2d 
1302, 1304 (Ohio Com. Pi . 1983) . In short, the Williams opinion 
embodies the l o g i c a l extension of Leon in to the area of 
warrantless searches and s e i z u r e s . It i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive 
of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would not apply 
the Leon rule in a case where an o f f i c e r ' s warrantless conduct, 
subsequently determined to be in v i o l a t i o n of the fourth 
amendment, was o b j e c t i v e l y reasonable under the circumstances. 
See I .N .S . v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055-56 (1984) 
(White, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ; people v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1153 
(Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J. , concurring) (observing that 
Colorado's s tatutory "good f a i t h " exception t o the exclusionary 
rule i s cons i s tent with fourth amendment precedent and does not 
v i o l a t e federal cons t i tu t iona l standards); Bloom, "United s t a t e s 
v» Leon And I t s Ramifications," 56 Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 
(1985) . ML see United S ta te s v . Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698-99 
(9th Cir . 1986) (refusing t o extend Leon rat ionale to warrantless 
s i t u a t i o n ) ; Greenhalgh, "The Warrantless Good Faith Exception— 
Unprecedented, Indefens ib le , and Devoid of Necess i ty ," 26 S. Tex. 
L.J. 129 (1985) . 
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F i n a l l y , although i t does not bear on the federal 
cons t i tu t iona l i s sue and r e l a t e s only t o the appropriateness of 
Rule 12(g) under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n (which, as noted e a r l i e r , 
should not be an i s s u e in that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , 
presumably b e l i e v e s that the rule does not create any s t a t e 
cons t i tu t iona l problems), i t i s worth noting that a number of 
courts have adopted the Leon good f a i t h exception as part of 
the ir s ta te exclusionary r u l e , g t a t e v. Brown* 708 So.2d at 145-
46; Mers v . State* 482 N.E.2d at 782-83; McFarland v . State* 284 
Ark. at 549, 684 S.W.2d at 243; S ta te v. Wood* 457 So.2d at 210-
11; S ta te v. Bolt* 142 Ariz. 260 , 689 P.2d 519 (1984) . But, see 
People v. Biqelow* 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451 , 457-
58 (1985); S ta te v . Novembrino* 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 
(1985); S ta te v. Houston* 359 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 1984) — 
cases r e j e c t i n g Leon on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds. 
Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion and the probable 
cause ana lys i s se t forth in subsect ion A, the t r i a l court should 
not have excluded the challenged evidence under Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
There simply was no showing that Caz ier f s search pursuant t o a 
warrant cons t i tu ted a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n of 
defendant's r i g h t s . The warrant issued e i ther was supported by 
probable cause (thus no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n when Cazier 
executed i t ) , or i f determined t o be inva l id due to the technical 
inadequacy of Cazier1 s a f f i d a v i t , was reasonably r e l i e d upon by 
the o f f i cer who, under an objec t ive reasonableness t e s t , had no 
b a s i s for be l i ev ing that the warrant was i n v a l i d . See UTAH CODE 
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ANN. 77-23-12 (1982) . 1 6 Also, the t r i a l court was not obligated 
to conclude from the evidence before i t that the o f f i c e r s 
"intimidated" and "terrorized" d e f e n d a n t s mother before she 
allowed them t o look at defendant's truck, and that t h i s rendered 
the subsequent search inva l id because of the of f icers* bad f a i t h . 
5JB£ Br* of App. at 19-20. The court was free t o a s s e s s the 
testimony of the wi tnesses at the suppression hearing and to draw 
from that whatever reasonable inferences i t wished. See State v. 
Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73 , 75-76 , 513 P.2d 435 , 436-37 (1973). Ms. 
Babbell never t e s t i f i e d that she was e i ther intimidated or 
terror ized by the o f f i c e r s or that she re luctant ly allowed them 
t o examine defendant's truck (R. 147-56, 439-40) . She merely 
s tated that she would not have allowed the two men to look at 
defendant's truck if she had known they were po l i ce o f f i cers (R. 
153) . In f a c t , contrary to defendant's a s s e r t i o n s , Ms. Babbell 
t e s t i f i e d that the a l leged of fens ive comment concerning the 
shooting of her son did not occur unti l the o f f i c e r s second v i s i t 
t o her home, wel l after the ir f i r s t v i s i t when they had received 
permission to examine defendant's truck (R. 147 -52 ) . 
1 6
 Section 77-23-12 provides: 
Pursuant to the standards described in sec t ion 77-35-12 (g) 
property or evidence se ized pursuant t o a search warrant sha l l 
not be suppressed at a motion, t r i e d , or other proceeding unless 
the unlawful conduct of the peace o f f i cer i s shown to be 
s u b s t a n t i a l . Any unlawful search or se izure shal l be cx>nsidered 
subs tant ia l and in bad f a i t h if the warrant was obtained with 
malic ious purpose and without probable cause or was executed 
mal ic ious ly and w i l l f u l l y beyond the authority of the warrant or 
with unnecessary s e v e r i t y . 
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